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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Thus it appears that the North Carolina court recognizes that dis-
claimers may be effective.
It is apparent, however, that a disclaimer would not preclude a
recovery of the purchase price by the buyer should the seller furnish
non-merchantable goods. In Williams v. Dixie Chevrolet Co.,25 in-
volving the sale of an automobile, the court stated that the purchaser
could recover for want of consideration if the car were not fit for its
intended use due to the defect. The court said, "The refusal to warrant
against worthlessness would fall with the balance of the supposed con-
tract for want of consideration." 2 6  Of course, if the terms of the dis-
claimer apply only to quality, it will in no way affect an implied war-
ranty of merchantability.2r
The New Jersey court appears to be the first to declare this stand-
ard automobile disclaimer void.28  Courts of other jurisdictions have
given the disclaimer its full effect29 and have held that it does not
violate public policy.A0 It would seem, however, that the prior cases
have not met the real problem as seen by the New Jersey court-that
while a disclaimer of warranty should be available to parties who choose
so to contract, the imposition of these conditions by virtually all auto-
mobile manufacturers does not result in a freely bargained for and
fairly obtained agreement. It is submitted that the solution to this
problem can only be found by invoking the doctrine of public policy.
ROBERT B. BLYTHE
Torts-Negligently Induced Fright Causing Physical Injury to
Hypersensitive Plaintiff.,
In Williamson v. Bennett' the defendant negligently drove her auto-
mobile into that of the plaintiff; plaintiff did not see what had struck her,
but thinking that she had killed a child on a bicycle 2 she became fright-
ened. Plaintiff came to a stop and then saw that an automobile and not
a child had collided with her. Though plaintiff suffered no immediate
'209 N.C. 29, 182 S.E. 719 (1935).8Id. at 31, 182 S.E. at 721.
"* Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Mfg. Co., 169 N.C. 41, 85 S.E. 35 (1915).
" Another provision of the warranty has been attacked. In Mills v. Maxwell
Motor Sales Corp., 105 Neb. 465, 181 N.W. 152 (1920), the court stated, in a
dictum, that it was against "every conception of justice" to allow the manufacturer
to be the sole judge as to whether parts were so defective as to be replaceable.
" Shafer v. Reo Motors, 205 F.2d 685 (3rd Cir. 1953) ; L. R. Cooke Chevrolet
Co. v. Culligan Soft Water Serv., 282 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1955); Hall v. Everett
Motors, Inc., 165 N.E2d 107 (Mass. 1960).
" Brokerick Haulage, Inc. v. Mack-International Motor Truck Corp., 1 App.
Div. 2d 649, 153 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
'251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E2d 48 (1960).
'About a month before the accident plaintiff's brother-in-law had killed a child
on a bicycle when she rode into the side of his car. 251 N.C. at 500, 112 S.E.2d at
49.
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physical injury, later in the day she became nervous and otherwise
mentally upset, which condition became steadily worse. She subse-
quently complained that the corner of her mouth was drawn, her tongue
swollen, her left side numb, and her swallowing and sleeping impaired.
A psychiatrist testified that her condition was.a conversion reaction3
caused by the accident; he further stated that prior to this the plaintiff
had a more than ordinary proneness to neurosis. 4 The jury found that
defendant's negligence had proximately caused plaintiff's injury and
awarded her $4,000 damages. In reversing the award the supreme
court held that defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of
plaintiff's harm.
Courts in the United States have enunciated a variety of reasons
for denying recovery for physical injury induced by fright. Some
courts5 have held that the physical consequences of fright were not
the proximate result of defendant's negligence because those conse-
quences were not foreseeable. The better rule would appear to be that
it need only be shown that defendant's negligent act was likely to cause
harm to the plaintiff. When such is the case, defendant should be liable
not only for foreseeable injuries but for all harm resulting therefrom in
an unbroken chain of causation.6 The negligent defendant should take
his victim as he finds him ;7 thus whether the injury results directly, as
through contact, or indirectly, as through fright, liability would ensue.
Some courts" have held that since there can be no recovery for fright
alone there can be none for the consequences of fright. However, as
stated previously, if the defendant's conduct is negligent, i.e., if it was
3 This is a reaction where emotional and psychological nervousness or anxiety
is so intense that it is converted into a physical symptom. The reaction can also
be described as a post-traumatic neurosis, i.e., the neurosis will appear after the
trauma. Trauma in this sense need not be a physical injury but may be a forceful
psychological effect. Humphreys v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 116 So. 2d 130 (La.
1959).
'The doctor said further that the plaintiff's symptoms were typically those of
a conversion reaction and that the plaintiff was not malingering.
"E.g., Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898) ; Mitchell v. Rochester
R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
'Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909). Seitz, Ditty and
Foreseeability Factors in Fright Cases, 23 M.RQ. L. RuV. 103, 108-09 (1939);
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. Ray. 260, 270-72 (1921); cf.
Reynolds v. Murph, 241 N.C. 60, 84 S.E.2d 273 (1954); Hart v. Curry, 238 N.C.
448, 78 S.E.2d 170 (1953). Contra, Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285,
47 N.E. 88 (1897); Oehler v. Bamberger & Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 1003, 135 Atl. 71
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 103 N.J.L. 703, 137 Atl. 425 (Ct. Err. & App. 1926).
'Nelson v. Black, 266 P2d 817 (Dist. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 43
C.2d 612, 275 P.2d 473 (1954) ; Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 13 A.2d 677 (1940) ;
see Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265
(1958). Contra, Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., supra note 6; Oehler v. Bamberger
& Co., mipra note 6.
8 St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901) ; Mitchell
v.-Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). Contra, Chiuchiolio v. New
England Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1950).
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reasonably foreseeable that injury would result, then the character of
the causal connection should be irrelevant0
Other courts have denied recovery on policy grounds; they have
stated that a flood of litigation would result if a cause of action were
recognized l° Notwithstanding these warnings the expected flood of
cases has not developed in those jurisdictions which recognize an
action,1 and the overwhelming majority of recent decisions have rejected
this argument.'2
As some opinions state 3 the apprehension of fraud is probably the
reason motivating most courts which deny recovery. 14 This policy
would be just only if all the claims were fictitious. If any claims are
meritorious, it is the duty of the courts to furnish a remedy for them.' 5
The ultimate answer to the fraud argument must lie in the courts' belief
in the ability of our juries to distinguish true from fraudulent claims. 6
North Carolina has had few cases involving negligently inflicted
fright with resulting physical injury. Several cases have involved
injury resulting from fright induced by negligently executed dynamite
"'The fundamental vice of the court's opinion is that it assumes that the plain-
tiff is alleging her fright as the ground for her recovery, and is alleging the
physical consequences merely in aggravation of the damages to be recovered,
whereas the fact is that she has alleged and proved her physical injury as her
ground of action and ... the fright merely to show the causal- connection between
... negligence and her physical injury. The opinion shows a complete inability
to distinguish between fright as the injury ... and fright as a necessary link in the
chain of causation . . .' BOHLEN, TORTS 265-66 (1926).
20 Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) ; Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). Other cases have allowed re-
covery and have controverted this statement: Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni,
15 Ala. App. 316, 43 So. 205 (1916) ; Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69,
73 At!. 688 (1909) ; Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 Atl. 202 (1907).
"Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141, 158; Goodhart, The Shock
Cases and Area of Risk, 16 MODERN L. REv. 14, 24 (1953); Smith, Relation of
Emotions to Injury and Disease; Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L.
REv. 193, 211 n.47 (1944).
"' "The fear of the successful prosecutibn of fraudulent claims ... has not im-
pressed the majority of judges ... as is evidenced by the fact that of the twentyjurisdictions which considered this problem for the first time during the present
century, seventeen have granted the right of recovery." Second Annual Report
of the Law Revision Commission, Act, Recommendation and Study Relating to
Liability for Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, State of New York 375,
379-80 (1936).3 Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) ; Comstock
v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) ; Huston v. Freemansburg Borough,
212 Pa. 548, 61 Adt. 1022 (1905).
" See generally Note, Fright and the Court's Fear of Fraud, 23 PENN. B.A.Q.
203 (1952).
'
5 Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 1 K.B. 669, 681; Note, Mental Disturbance
in the Law of Torts-A Problem of Legal Lag, 6 Wzs. Rzs. L. REv. 384, 386
(1955); 15 CL-KENT L. REv. 323, 326 (1937).
" Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Balodoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Seitz, Relational Fact Situation and Emotional Make-Up as Holding Solution to
Problems in Fright Cases, 20 B.U.L. REv. 676, 679 (1940) ; see Nelson v. Black,
266 P.2d 817 (Dist. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 43 C.2d 612, 275 P.2d 473
(1954); Dimmick v. Follis, 123 Ind. App. 701, 111 N.E.2d 486 (1953).
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blasting.17 Though these cases contain language 8 that would logically
apply to the fact situation in Williamson, the court in Williamson dis-
tinguished the dynamite cases on the basis of the strict liability imposed
on one using a dangerous instrumentality. The court has allowed re-
covery for mental anguish with resulting physical injury in cases of
willful infliction of mental anguish, 19 browbeatiig bill collectors, 20 negli-
gent handling of dead bodies,-' and negligent transmission of death
messages.22  Williamson, however, did not discuss these cases.2
The holding in Williamson probably was based on the established
North Carolina position that one cannot recover damages for mental
anguish arising from fear for the safety or well-being of another.
4
The cause of plaintiff's conversion reaction was fear for the safety of a
non-existent 25 child. The North Carolina rule, however, heretofore
has been based on the situation where the physical injury precedes the
mental anguish and the mental anguish is sought to be established as an
element of damages-as where the plaintiff is physically injured and
worries over his inability to support his children. Decisions in other
jurisdictions 26 are in conflict as to whether recovery should be allowed
for injury'caused by fear for the safety of another where the mental
anguish is not an element of damages for a concededly compensable in-
jury but is rather the vehicle which creates the injury itself.
It also seems possible that in Williamson the court denied recovery
on the theory that the plaintiff's neurosis was an intervening cause which
"'Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 73 S.E. 211 (1911); Kimberly v. Howland,
143 N.C. 399, 55 S.E. 778 (1906) ; Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 536, 42
S.E. 983 (1902).
"8 "The nerves are as much a part of the physical system as the limbs, and in
some persons are very delicately adjusted, and when 'out of tune' cause excruciating
agony. We think the general principles of torts support a right of action for
physical injuries resulting from negligence, whether wilful or otherwise, none the
less strongly because the physical injury consists of a wrecked nervous system in-
stead of lacerated limbs. Injuries of the former class are frequently more painful
and enduring than those of the latter ... " Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398,
403-04, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906). (Emphasis added.)
"May v. Western Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 416, 72 S.E. 1059 (1911).
20 Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936).
" Morrow v. Cline, 211 N.C. 254, 190 S.E. 207 (1937). See also, for a dis-
cussion of quasi-property rights, 30 N.C.L. REv. 299 (1952).
" Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943).
23 For an excellent discussion of similar cases see PaossER, TORTS 43-44 (2d ed.
1955).
"'Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925);
Ferebee v. Norfolk So. R.R., 163 N.C. 351, 79 S.E. 685 (1913), aff'd, 238 U.S. 269(1915).
" 'This would seem to be a step beyond fear for the safety of another person.
"Denying recovery: Southern Ry. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916) ;
Nuckles v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927);
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). Allowing recovery:
Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933); Hill v. Kimball, 76
Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
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broke the connection between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
injuries. The court stated that "the defendant's negligence was not
that cause which 'in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
new and independent cause,' produced plaintiff's injury."2 7 The more
logical view would seem to be that even if the neurosis were an inter-
vening cause it was not a controlling cause; defendant's negligence was
the actual cause of plaintiff's fright, but for which fright plaintiff's latent
neurosis would not have resulted in injury.28
At least one court has stated2 9 that a defendant is under no duty to
foresee that a person is extraordinarily susceptible to injury. Another
court30 has made liability depend on whether or not the defendant had
knowledge of plaintiff's abnormal susceptibility. The majority of those
jurisdictions31 which allow recovery, however, have held that if de-
fendant's negligent conduct was likely to injure an average person then
defendant also would be liable for injury to the specially susceptible.
Although the opinion in Williamson discussed the entire area of
damages for mental anguish and physical injuries resulting therefrom,
pointing out the confusion and contradictions among other courts,3 2 it
2T 251 N.C. at 507, 112 S.E.2d at 54.8 Hall v. Excelsior Steam Laundry Co., 5 La. App. 6 (1925) ; Simone v. Rhode
Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 Atl. 202 (1907) ; Padgett v. Colonial Distrib. Co., 232
S.C. 593, 103 S.E2d 265 (1958); cf. Hanford v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 113
Neb. 423, 203 N.W. 643 (1925); Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 234 N.C. 206, 67
S.E.2d 63 (1951); Riggs v. Akers Motor Lines, 233 N.C. 160, 63 S.E.2d 197(1951).
"D Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
" Oehler v. Bamberger & Co., 4 NJ. Misc. 1003, 135 Atl. 71 (Sup. Ct. 1926),
aff'd, 103 N.J.L. 703, 137 Ati. 425 (Ct. Err. & App. 1926).
" Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 13 A.2d 677 (1940); Humphries v. Delta
Fire & Cas. Co., 116 So. 2d 130 (La. 1959) ; Hall v. Excelsior Steam Laundry Co.,
5 La. App. 6 (1925) ; Sutton Motor Co. v. Crysel, 289 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. 1956) ;
Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rav. 193, 260-61 (1944). See generally, 22 ST. JOHN's L. Rv.
135 (1947).
. Jurisdictions which deny recovery for negligently inflicted fright with re-
suiting physical injury, in the absence of some exception to their general rule,
include: Arkansas-Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920);
Illinois-Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Iowa-Kramer v.
Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091 (1913) ; Kentucky-Morse v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S.W. 361 (1903) ; Maine-Herrick v. Evening Express
Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 Atl. 16 (1921); Massachusetts-Spade v. Lynn &
Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Michigan-Alexander v. Pacholek,
222 Mich. 157, 192 N.W. 652 (1923); Missouri-Strange v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 61
Mo. App. 586 (1895); New Jersey-Legac v. Vietmeyer Bros., 7 NJ. Misc. 615,
147 At. 110 (1929) ; New York-Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E.
354 (1896) ; Ohio-Miller v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499
(1908); Pennsylvania-Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23
Atl. 340 (1892).
States allowing recovery for negligent infliction of fright with resulting physical
injury are: Alabama-Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316,
73 So. 205 (1916); California-Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440
(1918) ; Connecticut-Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941) ;
Georgia-Goddard v. Walters, 14 Ga. App. 722, 82 S.E. 304 (1914); Kansas-
Clemm v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928); Louisiana-
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is doubtful that the court's holdilig can be interpreted as firmly placing
North Carolina in the list of jurisdictions denying recovery for a physical
injury resulting from negligently inflicted fright.
RAYMOND A. JOLLY, JR.
Laird v. Natchitochas Oil Mill Inc., 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929); Mary-
land-Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 At. 182 (1933); Montana-Cashin
v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934); Nebraska-Netusil v.
Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N.W. 335' (1931); New Hampshire-Chiuchiolio v.
New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930); Oregon-
Salmi v. Columbia & N. R.R., 75 Ore. 200, 146 Pac. 819 (1915); Rhode Island-
Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 At. 202 (1907) ; South Carolina-
Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958) ;
South Dakota-Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S.D. 396, 167 N.W. 398 (1918); Tennes-
see-:-Memphis St. Ry3. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917) ; Texas-
Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890); Virginia-Bowles v. May, 159
Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932); Washington-Cherry v. General Petroleum Corp.,
172 Wash. 688, 21 P.2d 520 (1933); West Virginia-Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W.
Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924); Wisconsin-Pankopf v. Henkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123
N.W. 625 (1909). This footnote is a corrected version of the state by state break-
down found in Second Annual Report of the Law Revision Commission, Act,
Recommendation and Study Relating to Liability for Injuries Resulting from
Fright or Shock, State of New York 375, 392 n.34 406 n.80 (1936), and in Mc-
Niece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New l'ork, 24 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1,
14 n.40, 16 n.43 (1949).
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